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NORTH DAKOTA’S NOVEL APPROACH 
TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 
OR A FUTILE ASSERTION OF LARGE 
SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many Americans, the sudden and shocking failure of the Enron 
Corporation will be remembered as the most significant corporate event of 
their generation.1  Indeed, the infamous collapse of the energy giant has 
proven not to have simply been a seminal business event.2  Enron’s demise 
and the wake of successive corporate scandals3 have led to discussions and 
subsequent measures that have marked a turning point in United States 
corporate governance.4 
With these scandals emerged a national dialogue focusing on corporate 
accountability and protection of shareholders who invest in those institu-
tions.5  One observer noted, “America’s shareholders are growing restless, 
and the bosses of the companies they own seem increasingly nervous as 
 
*Winner of the 2008 North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Case Comment 
Award. 
1. Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate 
(Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 36 (2005). 
2. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance 
Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 855-56 (2003). 
3. See, e.g., John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s 
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 84 (2005) (“Enron was a failing company propped up by 
accounting games, deceptive transactions, and financial statement manipulation.”).  For example, 
Enron had been fraudulently reporting its financial situation to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission on its 10-Q and 10-K forms.  Id. at 71.  The WorldCom scandal also involved accounting 
fraud, which included operating costs being improperly recorded as capital expenditures to dis-
guise huge losses as profit.  Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and 
Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 369-70 (2003).  The Adelphia scandal arose 
out of a $2.5 billion accounting scandal that subsequently led to Adelphia’s bankruptcy.  Id. at 
370-71. 
4. Elson & Gyves, supra note 2, at 855-56; see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (stating that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in which Congress legislated several corporate governance measures into 
the federal securities law, is not only a considerable change in substantive law, but also a diver-
gence in the mode of regulation). 
5. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Maximizing the Wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which 
Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, 32 J. CORP. L. 381, 382 (2007) (“[C]orporate governance 
practices have come under close scrutiny.”). 
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they peer out from behind their boardroom curtains.”6  In the 2007 legisla-
tive session, North Dakota interjected itself into this ongoing national 
debate of management in public corporations by enacting the North Dakota 
Publicly Traded Corporations Act (NDPTCA).7  The statute pulls together 
many issues for which activist shareholder groups advocate: limiting direc-
tor term limits, restricting poison pills, separating the roles of chairman and 
chief executive officer, permitting votes on compensation reports, and alter-
ing plurality voting to majority voting regarding directors, among others.8 
This note focuses on public corporations, companies that are permitted 
to offer securities for sale to the general public, usually through the stock 
markets.9  Furthermore, this note analyzes and critically evaluates both the 
purpose and the practical effect of North Dakota’s newly enacted law.  Part 
II provides an overview of the structure and history of corporations as well 
as their governance practices in America.10  Part III describes the competing 
philosophies that surround the corporate governance process.11  Part IV 
takes a critical and skeptical look at the desirability and feasibility of apply-
ing the NDPTCA.12 
II. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA 
Part II provides an overview of corporations beginning with Section A, 
which presents a general summary of corporate governance.13  Section B 
 
6. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2006) (quoting Ownership Matters; Shareholder Democ-
racy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 10). 
7. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-35 (2007). 
8. Id. §§ 10-35-06(1)-(3); 10-35-09(2)-(3); 10-35-12(5); 10-35-22; 10-36-06(4) (2007).  
Crystal R. Reid, Corporate Landscape Changing, BISMARCK TRIB., May 6, 2007, at B1. 
9. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 89 (2d 
ed. 2004).  Publicly held companies are: (1) corporations traded on a national securities exchange; 
and (2) those with 500 or more shareholders and $10 million or more in assets.  Steven A. 
Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to 
the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 317 (2007).  The North Dakota Century Code makes clear that 
the NDPTCA applies “only to a publicly traded corporation . . . during such time as its articles 
state that it is governed by this chapter.” § 10-35-03(1). 
10. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the organization, roles, and evolution of 
corporations and the governance process). 
11. See discussion infra Part III (examining the various opinions of what the shareholders’ 
role should be in a corporation). 
12. See discussion infra Part IV (providing a skeptical analysis of which corporations may 
have an interest in the NDPTCA, which entities may benefit from the existence of this law, how 
the law addresses recent corporate scandals, and the difference of certain language in the 
NDPTCA compared with contemporary corporate law). 
13. See discussion infra Part II.A (presenting a broad definition of what corporate 
governance is and various sources of governance for corporations). 
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discusses the organization of the corporation, including the various roles 
performed within the corporate structure.14  Section C provides a brief 
history of the American corporation, as well as historical efforts aimed at 
reforming corporations.15 
A. WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 
While several definitions of corporate governance exist, generally the 
term governs the internal affairs of the corporation, such as the “structure, 
relationships, . . . and objectives of the corporat[ion].”16  Traditionally, state 
law has provided the framework for the internal structure with regard to the 
affairs of the corporation.17  This framework is recognized as the “internal 
affairs doctrine.”18  Each state in the United States has a statute or set of 
laws that governs how corporations in that state are structured, the process 
for incorporation, and the configuration of the board of directors.19 
Pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine, state courts are obligated to 
accept the law of the incorporating state, even if that state’s law is inconsis-
tent with the law of the forum state.20  Although some states try to regulate 
foreign corporations in certain circumstances,21 the legitimacy of this is 
dubious.22  For example, in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of 
America,23 the United States Supreme Court nearly made it a constitutional 
mandate that the state of incorporation possess the authority to regulate the 
internal affairs of the corporation.24 
 
14. See discussion infra Part II.B (describing the responsibilities of directors, officers, and 
shareholders). 
15. See discussion infra Part II.C (describing the evolution of the American corporation and 
historical reform efforts as compared to contemporary governance issues). 
16. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corpo-
rate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005); see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 456, 460 (2004) (“The term ‘corporate governance’ is widely used to refer to the balance of 
power between officers, directors, and shareholders.”). 
17. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 1411. 
18. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 14. 
19. Id. 
20. See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209, 212 (Del. 1987) (applying Panama law 
even though the rules were barred under Delaware law and the law of other states). 
21. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. § 2115 (2007) (regulating corporations that have fifty percent of 
property, payroll and sales factors, and outstanding securities in California). 
22. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No principle of cor-
poration law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic 
corporations.”). 
23. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
24. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89. 
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Delaware, the place of incorporation to more than half of the country’s 
public corporations, has developed a body of law that is greatly respected 
and considered highly influential in the area of corporate law.25  One reason 
so many corporations choose to incorporate in Delaware is that its bar and 
judiciary are considered extremely knowledgeable in understanding the 
intricacies of corporate law.26  Further, Delaware’s case law leads to 
predictability and stability for corporate planning and strategy.27 
Until 2002, corporate governance was principally an issue of state 
law.28  The federal government’s role prior to 2002 was limited to the 
disclosure of information to investors, mostly concerning initial public 
offerings and securities trading.29  The subsequent enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the federal government’s response to several large 
corporate scandals, included a number of provisions impacting corporate 
governance.30  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley requires the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules compelling issuers to 
disclose whether they apply a code of ethics to senior financial officers,31 
obliges independent audit committees for all listed companies,32 and pro-
hibits corporations from giving credit to officers or directors (with some 
exceptions).33  Sarbanes-Oxley also added numerous provisions increasing 
or creating civil and criminal consequences, including an additional felony 
for securities fraud34 and federal protection for whistleblowers.35 
 
25. See HARRIET SMITH WINDSOR, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, DELAWARE DEP’T OF 
STATE DIV. OF CORPS., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 1, available at http://www.corp.delaware.gov/ 
2006%20Annual%20Report%20with%20Signature%20_2_.pdf (reporting that sixty-one percent 
of the Fortune 500 companies and half of the United States firms traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ are incorporated in Delaware).  In addition, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery is a 215-year-old court that has written and shaped much of the modern corporate case 
law.  Id. 
26. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 16. 
27. Id. 
28. Jeffrey D. Hern, Delaware Courts’ Delicate Response to the Corporate Governance 
Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightening Judicial Scrutiny on Directors of Corporations, 41 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 207, 207-08 (2005). 
29. Id. at 207-08 (citing Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1992)). 
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
31. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2002). 
32. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (2002). 
33. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 402(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2002).  The company may offer credit if 
it is a financial institution extending credit in the ordinary course of business and the terms are the 
same as those offered to the public.  Id. 
34. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2002). 
35. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(4) (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1107, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1513 (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley, § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002). 
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Additionally, the SEC and other federal agencies remain sources of 
corporate governance in public companies.36  The SEC’s role in corporate 
governance arises “from its mission to protect investors, maintain market 
[integrity], and facilitate capital formation.”37  At times, the SEC has taken 
a less direct approach to governance, such as encouraging the securities ex-
changes to pass governance rules as a way to advance investor protection.38  
More direct regulatory attempts by the SEC have taken the form of dis-
closure regulation as opposed to imposing overt governance requirements.39  
For example, pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC enacted rules, which 
require management participation in the assessment and certification of 
internal controls in public corporations.40 
Corporations also have internal documents that provide additional 
sources of governance, such as the articles of incorporation.41  The articles 
of incorporation provide a corporation’s functions, objectives, and some 
matters of governance.42  “The articles of incorporation are wholly [public-
ly] filed with the secretary of state.”43  To complete the formation process, 
the corporation must also adopt a set of bylaws, which are not publicly filed 
as are the articles of incorporation.44  The corporation’s bylaws also include 
various provisions with respect to the governance and internal affairs of the 
corporation.45  Bylaws often set the rules for important functions of gover-
nance, such as rules for shareholder meetings; how the board of directors 
will operate (including election and removal); and the rules with respect to 
officers, agents, and employees, among others.46 
 
36. Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 892 (2007).  
Agencies other than the SEC tend to play smaller roles.  Id.  For example, the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission provide 
governance structures and rules specific to the companies and industries they regulate.  Id. at 892 
n.29. 
37. Id. at 893 (quoting SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation (2007), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. (citing Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and 
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Rates, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8238 
& 34-47, 986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36, 636, Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 
33-8238.htm). 
41. 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 171 (2004). 
42. Id. 
43. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 13. 
44. Id. 
45. Id.  A corporation’s bylaws address issues such as shareholder’s meetings (for example, 
location and voting rights), the function of the board of directors, and key provisions regarding the 
rules of officers and employees.  Id. at 13 n.47. 
46. Id. 
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Finally, corporate law, as interpreted by the judiciary, also provides 
important guidance.47  Case law supplies the principles of fiduciary duties, 
norms, expectations, and standards designed to impact the organization, 
relationships, and objectives of corporations.48  This arrangement allows 
flexibility and avoids the one-size-fits-all approach that would otherwise 
accompany an expansive and unyielding codified system.49  Apart from the 
state, federal, and internal regulatory framework of corporations, the vari-
ous roles of directors, shareholders, and managers also play a pivotal role in 
the governance process.50 
B. ROLES ASSUMED WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 
One central and venerable principle of American corporate law is that 
the board of directors is granted the power to manage the corporation.51  
After they are elected to the board, “directors act as fiduciaries [toward] the 
corporation”52 and generally consider it a fiduciary duty to maximize share-
holder gains.53  The actual number of directors is usually a matter settled in 
the articles of incorporation or bylaws.54  The management of a corporation 
is vested heavily in its board of directors, leaving only a few specific 
shareholder voting rights.55  The board of directors, while maintaining its 
supervisory role, gives officers in the corporation the flexibility to execute 
the board’s directives.56 
 
47. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 1411. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1412. 
50. See discussion infra Part II.B (examining the different roles of those involved with the 
corporate governance process). 
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorpora-
tion.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-32 (2007) (“The business and affairs of a corporation must be 
managed by or under the direction of a board.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) [hereinafter 
MBCA] (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business 
and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors.”).  See also 
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2003) (following a statutory similar in substance, but 
one that does not follow the MBCA).  “[T]he business of a corporation shall be managed under 
the direction of its board of directors.”  Id. 
52. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 123. 
53. Crespi, supra note 5, at 386 (citing NAT’L ASSOC. OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE 
NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR COMPENSATION: PURPOSES, PRINCIPLES, AND 
BEST PRACTICES 1 (1995)). 
54. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 124. 
55. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561, 569 (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to 
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391 tbl.2 (2003)). 
56. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 123. 
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The officers, charged with managing the daily operations of the corpo-
ration, receive their operational authority from the board of directors.57  
Officers also assume a fiduciary duty toward the corporation and are 
considered “agents” of the corporation.58  Often, authority is concentrated 
in the chief executive officer and other senior level management.59 
The shareholders, considered by many to be the owners of the corpo-
ration, possess the residual claim on assets. 60  While shareholders have the 
right to elect and remove directors, they generally have a limited role in 
corporate decision-making.61  As a general rule, shareholders possess the 
right to elect directors, vote on vacancies, and vote on amendments to the 
articles of incorporation and bylaws.62  However, corporate changes must 
be proposed by the board of directors.63 
With respect to governance matters in publicly traded firms, the issues 
that arise are commonly related to the nature of the ownership in the corpo-
ration.64  For example, the shareholders of a publicly traded company are 
largely dispersed.65  Most disputes in the governance of publicly traded 
companies arise out of shareholders’ limited rights to participate in the 
management versus the directors’ province to operate free from shareholder 
interference.66 
As a result of this arrangement, there is a separation of control and 
ownership.67  This arrangement provides for little direct oversight by share-
holders.68  It does not mean, however, that shareholders are left without 
 
57. Id. at 126. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 127. 
60. Id. at 106.  But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights] (explaining that while shareholders own the residual claim on the corporation’s earnings 
and assets, “[o]wnership of the residual claim is not the same as ownership of the corporation 
itself”).  For it to be possible to own the corporation, a corporation would have to be capable of 
being owned.  Id.  However, this is impossible due to the corporation’s status as a work of “legal 
fiction.”  Id.; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 789, 804 (2007) (“Corporations are independent legal entities that own themselves; share-
holders own only a security, called ‘stock’ with very limited legal rights.”). 
61. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569. 
62. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 107.  Additionally, shareholders may vote on other 
issues such as mergers and liquidation.  Id. 
63. Stout, supra note 60, at 793 (citing Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999)). 
64. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 87. 
65. Id.  However, some public firms “have a concentration of shareholders that act together 
to control the corporation through the election of directors.”  Id. at 88.  In this situation, public 
stockholders assume a minority position.  Id. 
66. Id. at 87. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
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protection.69  In addition to market constraints, shareholders also have legal 
protections including:  management’s fiduciary duty, proxy battles to 
change management, tender offers to remove managers, and regulations of 
the SEC.70 
C. HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES 
Early in American history, companies were publicly chartered largely 
for public utility purposes, such as inland navigation and toll roads.71  
However, as the eighteenth century ended, the young nation needed credit 
and an infrastructure to assist development, and the corporate structure best 
met those needs.72  The corporate form provided a legal framework suited 
to gathering the vast amount of money needed to grow capital-intensive 
industries and accomplish business and pecuniary objectives.73 
As the Industrial Revolution transformed the economy during the nine-
teenth century, America experienced increasing wealth and power concen-
trated in corporations.74  During this time, the public began to invest in 
corporations.75  Yet it was not until the late nineteenth century that techno-
logical innovation, especially railroads, began to give corporations a strong, 
influential, and long-lasting place in the economy.76  The success of the 
economy was met with increasing skepticism in the latter part of that cen-
tury when abuses grew rampant, especially in large corporations.77  Justice 
Brandeis remarked that states had historically limited incorporation 
practices because “[t]here was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in 
large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations.”78 
Furthermore, in the late nineteenth century, states around the country 
began liberalizing their corporation statutes, taking steps such as lowering 
 
69. Id. at 88. 
70. Id.  
71. Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: 
The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 220 (2006). 
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 220-21. 
74. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5. 
75. Id. 
76. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 220 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 390 (3d ed. 2005)). 
77. Id. at 221. 
78. Id. (citing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)).  In Liggett, Justice Brandeis noted that historically “the duration of corporate fran-
chises was generally limited to a period of 20, 30, or 50 years.”  Liggett, 288 U.S. at 555. 
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taxes and generally allowing management more flexibility.79  These 
changes often involved giving more authority to management rather than to 
shareholders.80  For example, the ultra vires doctrine, which served to limit 
corporate activities to its prescribed charter powers, was eroded.81  Further, 
the notion reemerged that the authority of the board of directors was 
“original and undelegated,” rather than delegated from the shareholders.82  
Proxy voting also changed; where previously banned in the nineteenth 
century, it became the twentieth century norm.83  Finally, shareholders lost 
the authority to remove members of the board at will.84 
During this period of time, monopolies dominated markets and fraud 
was pervasive, two trends which undermined confidence in the economy.85  
Around the mid-1910s, individual and institutional investors increasingly 
became important sources of public security financing.86  Suspicion of cor-
porations remained as corporate power continued to grow.87  The corporate 
abuses and fraud facilitated considerable public distrust of large corpora-
tions and those who managed them.88 
The Wall Street crash in 1929 brought yet more scrutiny from 
lawmakers.89  In response to the financial disaster, the federal government 
passed securities legislation.90  Interestingly enough, it was not the 
American corporate structure that was the target of reforms.91  For example, 
the federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934 did not seek to protect or em-
power shareholders.92  Rather, the laws were focused on supporting the 
principles of a healthy free market.93  The enactment of these new laws 
 
79. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5.  In the late nineteenth century, for example, New 
Jersey modified its incorporation statute to remove restrictions on “capitalization and assets, 
mergers and consolidations, the issuance of voting stock, the purpose(s) of incorporation, and the 
duration and locale of business.” Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1515 (quoting SCOTT R. 
BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, 
AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996)).  Other states also began liberalizing their general incorporation 
statutes as well, including Delaware.  Id. 
80. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5. 
81. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1522. 
82. Id. (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 99 (1992)). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 221-22. 
86. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1521. 
87. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5. 
88. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 222. 
89. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 5. 
90. Id. 
91. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 222. 
92. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1512. 
93. Id. 
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restricted corporate power, like the prohibition of monopolies94 and the 
issuance and trading requirements established by the Securities Act of 
193395 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.96  These measures, for the 
most part, did not directly impact corporate governance structures.97 
Since the scandals of WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia, and others erupted, 
some are once again questioning the trust placed in American corpora-
tions.98  The nature of the concern, however, is considerably different.99  
From the late twentieth century to the present, as exemplified in Enron and 
others, problems and scandals are interpreted as having more to do with 
internal issues of the corporation, rather than how corporate strength is 
applied within the economy.100  Some scholars argue these collapses point 
to a failure of corporate governance structures and principles to prevent 
exploitations.101  These events and subsequent investment losses reasonably 
explain why governance issues are presently under intense scrutiny, 
especially the relationship between directors and shareholders.102 
This renewed corporate scrutiny may also explain North Dakota’s 
willingness to adopt a novel act that so significantly departs from any other 
corporate statute in the United States.103  Keep in mind, however, that while 
the NDPTCA itself is a novel statute, the arguments surrounding increased 
shareholder participation are not new.104  The following discussion explores 
the differing philosophies of corporate governance.105 
 
94. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 71, at 222-23. 
95. Id. at 223 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (1997 & Supp. 2006)). 
96. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78mm). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See Hearing on HB 1340 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 60th N.D. Legis. Sess. 
1 (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.) (“The ultimate goal of 
Chapter 10-35 is to improve the performance of publicly traded companies by providing a new 
model of corporate governance.”).  In addition, noting the recent scandals in publicly traded com-
panies, “[t]he need for an alternative model of good corporate governance like Chapter 10-35 
remains as important as ever.”  Id. at 2. 
104. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-
Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 410 (1998) (noting that scholars and 
practitioners have long debated the allocation of power between directors and shareholders). 
105. See discussion infra Part III (comparing and contrasting the ideas and ideals surround-
ing the shareholder democracy theory and the director primacy theory). 
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III. COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES SURROUNDING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
There is presently a spirited debate among several prominent corporate 
law academics and observers regarding the role of shareholders in a public 
firm.106  Section A considers the argument of certain scholars that increased 
participation is healthy for public corporations.107  Section B considers the 
potential consequences of increasing shareholder participation.108 
A. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 
According to some prominent academics, the time has come to re-
evaluate the relationship structures of American corporate law.109  They 
advocate for the idea of a shareholder democracy, where shareholders have 
a stronger voice in the management of corporations.110  Such a role assumed 
by shareholders would improve corporate governance arrangements.111  The 
support for increased shareholder participation comes from the notion that 
shareholders are the principals of the corporation and management is in 
place to act as “agents” in directing the firm.112 
 
106. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy] (noting that 
increasing shareholder power would result in inefficiencies); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting 
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784-85 (2006) (arguing that substantial 
impediments facing shareholders should be reduced when they seek to replace incumbent direc-
tors and that shareholders should have more power to make decisions to change governance 
arrangements); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 836 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power] (questioning the 
distribution of power between boards and shareholders under current corporate law); see also 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 passim 
(2003) (stating the case for shareholder access to the corporate ballot and proposed SEC Rule 14a-
8); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s 
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1759 (2006) (responding to 
Bebchuk’s shareholder proposals from the perspective of an open but traditionalist perspective); 
Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 636 (arguing against increasing 
shareholder power as evidenced by the benefits provided in the director primacy model). 
107. See discussion infra Part III.A (noting the arguments for increased shareholder 
participation). 
108. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing the director primacy model of corporate 
governance). 
109. See Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 913 (arguing that the 
time has come to allow shareholders to make “rules-of-the-game” decisions, because for too long 
it has been a process controlled by management and directors). 
110. See id. at 850 (explaining that management and shareholders’ interests do not always 
“fully overlap,” and increased participation by shareholders “can provide constraints and incen-
tives that reduce deviations from shareholder-value maximization”). 
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 911 (noting that managers are “imperfect agent[s] for shareholders”).  But see 
PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 106 (stating that there is no actual legal principal/agent 
relationship between shareholders and directors in the corporate context). 
        
1172 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1161 
Additionally, proponents of the shareholder democracy concept con-
tend management will not always maximize the long-term value of their 
shares, because management has priorities and interests that may diverge 
from shareholders.113  For example, directors have little incentive to ensure 
a strong financial performance in the corporation since they do not them-
selves possess a significant financial interest in it.114  Consequently, agency 
costs can arise from this departure of interests.115  As a result, agency costs 
could have the effect of decreasing shareholder value.116  Without adequate 
oversight from shareholders, management may inappropriately divert 
resources, reject acquisitions that could benefit shareholders, over-invest in 
certain areas, etc.117  Accordingly, increasing shareholder influence and 
power over the decision-making process provides “constraints and incen-
tives” on management and takes an essential step towards resolving the 
agency issue.118 
Additionally, Delaware’s dominance as the major state of incorporation 
has been criticized as producing “a race to the bottom” because the laws 
favor management.119  Critics argue that management of a corporation will 
seek to incorporate into states that have pro-management laws in order to 
protect their interests, such as Delaware.120  Since a state has an economic 
incentive to encourage corporations to incorporate within their borders,121 
the theory argues that other states will follow that method to attract 
 
113. See Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 908 (arguing that 
increased shareholder participation would reduce agency costs between directors and 
shareholders). 
114. Stout, supra note 60, at 790. 
115. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 102.  From a law and economics approach, the 
relationship between the shareholders and management is described as an agency relationship.  Id.  
In the corporate context, the managers (acting as agents of the shareholders who are considered 
the principal) may have interests that diverge from shareholders and will not always act in the 
shareholders’ interests.  Id.  This increases the agency costs.  Id.  Agency costs can involve moni-
toring expenditures, bonding expenses (where the agent tries to assure the principal that costs will 
be curtailed), and residual losses.  Id. 
116. Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 850. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 15-16 (citing Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-58 
(1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
120. Id. at 16. 
121. See STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 2005 DELAWARE FISCAL 
NOTEBOOK, available at http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_05/Section02/ 
sec2page24.pdf (stating that in 2005, franchise fees paid by corporations and other entities to the 
State of Delaware generated around $500 million, or over seventeen percent of the state’s general 
fund revenues). 
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businesses, leaving shareholders without a state or set of laws that 
adequately protect their interests.122 
On the other side of the debate, critics argue vigorously against the 
notion that Delaware corporate law has caused a “race to the bottom.”123  
Indeed, many see Delaware’s and other states’ “management friendly” laws 
as benefiting shareholders, not harming them.124  Section III.B addresses the 
rationale for maintaining the division between shareholders and 
managers.125 
B. DIRECTOR PRIMACY 
From a director primacy perspective, Delaware has not caused a “race 
to the bottom” because it would be counterintuitive for a board to incor-
porate into a state that would hurt shareholders and possibly result in de-
valued shares.126  This would harm both management and shareholders 
because lower valued shares could possibly make the corporation a target 
for a takeover.127  Hence, the management of the underperforming company 
would likely be replaced with new management by the purchasing corpora-
tion.128  Accordingly, management will search for a state of incorporation 
that will enhance the value of the corporation’s shares.129  Under a director 
primacy theory, risk and flexibility and a rejection of the “shareholder 
democracy” notion both go toward running an efficient, profitable 
corporation.130 
1. Risk and Flexibility 
The director primacy philosophy provides that the board of directors is 
in the best position to deal with all of the corporation’s constituents, which 
include shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and 
 
122. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974) (noting the competition between state governments to attract 
corporations by offering the most advantageous laws to management). 
123. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 16. 
124. Id. 
125. See discussion infra Part III.B (putting forth the justifications for maintaining separation 
of directors and shareholders). 
126. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 16. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing how a corporate board can effectively serve as 
an entity for efficient decision-making and why the notion of a shareholder democracy is a 
misnomer). 
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others.131  In the public company, it is necessary to have a way of gathering 
the preferences of various constituencies and convert them into collective 
decisions.132  Having a centralized decision-making body allows the firm to 
be responsive to the shareholder who is concerned about the value of his or 
her stock, the customer who cares about the product, and the worker con-
cerned about wages and his or her work environment.133  The problem with 
shareholder activism is that it interrupts the means by which a large public 
firm is able to operate; the centralized and flexible decision-making process 
that is well-suited for a large corporation is disrupted.134 
In addition to efficiencies, the board of directors can provide risk-based 
decisions via the business judgment rule.135  Generally, the business judg-
ment rule is described as a presumption that “in making a business decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis . . . and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company 
[and its shareholders].”136  The business judgment rule protects not only the 
decision itself, but also serves to protect directors from incurring personal 
liability.137 
The rule essentially promotes the maximization of stockholder value.138  
Stockholders benefit from a profitable company that can attract capital and 
expand earnings as well as earning potential.139  Shareholders expect a 
board not to be risk averse.140  If a corporation’s goal is one of economic 
maximization, then shareholders’ reactions are not necessarily economically 
optimal.141  Shareholder reactions do not always take into consideration the 
risk necessary for achieving higher rewards, and to that end, these reactions 
should not be encouraged or facilitated.142  If corporations choose to modify 
their structure, directors must be careful so as not to be risk averse in 
 
131. See Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 626 (stating that 
one virtue of a public corporation is that it provides structured upper management well-suited to 
making important decisions). 
132. Id. at 622. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 626. 
135. E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A Response to Professor 
Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811, 815 (2007). 
136. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 747 (Del. Ch. 2005) (quoting 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
137. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 1422. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Veasey, supra note 135, at 815. 
142. Id. 
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executing their statutory directive to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation.143 
2. Rejection of the “Shareholder Democracy” Notion 
As previously stated, shareholder democracy envisions shareholders 
having a more active role in the management of a corporation, thereby im-
proving corporate governance.144  The idea of a shareholder democracy 
certainly holds an emotional appeal.145  Yet for critics, the idea is eschewed 
that corporations should be compelled to embrace political principles, such 
as the notion of shareholder democracy.146  Indeed, a proponent of the 
NDPTCA stated, “Being incorporated in North Dakota will represent a new 
seal of approval for publicly[]traded corporations committed to corporate 
democracy and improved performance.”147  However, the characterization 
of a corporation embodying true democratic principles is a somewhat unfair 
and unrealistic mixing of two diverse institutions that are governed by 
different models.148  The fusion, though improper, endures because of 
“intelligentsia’s far greater comfort and familiarity with political models 
and events than with knowledge and appreciation of how markets func-
tion.”149  These political and corporate institutions are not one and the 
same.150  The modern corporation is not a political creation; rather, it is a 
conception of market forces.151 
The comparison of political and corporate democracy is unfair on sev-
eral grounds.152  For example, note the voluntary nature of investing into a 
corporate entity as opposed to the reality that living in a polity is 
 
143. Id. at 814. 
144. See discussion supra note 109 (making the case for allowing shareholders to formulate 
“rules-of-the-game” decisions, rather than leaving the process to be controlled by management 
and directors). 
145. Stout, supra note 60, at 803.  “This larger myth of the benefits of shareholder control 
has captured hearts and minds not because it is based on evidence but because it has tremendous 
emotional appeal.”  Id. 
146. Henry G. Manne, The “Corporate Democracy” Oxymoron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, 
at A23. 
147. Hearing, supra note 103, at 1 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.). 
148. Manne, supra note 146, at A23. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id.  There is virtually no aspect of the corporation, also known as “capitalism’s greatest 
invention,” that cannot be traced to market influences.  Id. 
152. See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397 (2006) (“[C]orporations and political states are marked by 
differences so fundamental that it is dangerous to extrapolate lessons from one realm to the 
other.”). 
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involuntary.153  People have the choice of investing in various other forms 
of entities besides the corporate form, such as limited liability companies, 
partnerships, or nothing at all.154 
Further, the very idea of corporate democracy is undemocratic in sev-
eral ways.155  Power among shareholders is based upon the amount of 
money invested in the corporation, not based upon an individual’s status as 
a citizen, which is the case in a political democracy.156  Finally, a so-called 
corporate democracy could actually work to disenfranchise other corporate 
stakeholders like customers and employees, unless they have the desire and 
means to purchase stock.157  Disenfranchisement occurs because the share-
holders possess the authority to make decisions for the corporations other 
non-shareholder stakeholders, such as the employees and consumers.158 
While it is true that there are other legitimate and sound theories for 
distributing control this way, it serves to note that using the term “corporate 
democracy” or “shareholder democracy” is misleading and often misap-
plied.159  Our nation’s government derives legitimacy from the idea of a 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people.”160  However, a 
“democracy” with respect to shareholders is a narrow goal, which aims only 
at increasing corporate decision-making participation161 and is almost en-
tirely motivated by financial incentives.162  Presently there is no substantive 
concept of shareholder democracy unrelated to market demands.163  In 
addition to the “shareholder democracy” rationale for enacting this legisla-
tion, there are other reasons to be skeptical of the NDPTCA.164 
 
153. Id. at 1398. 
154. Id. 
155. Thomas J. Woo, Corporate Governance and the “D-Word,” 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1579, 1579 (2006). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 1587-88. 
159. Id. at 1579. 
160. Id. at 1587 (quoting President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 
1863)). 
161. Id. 
162. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1576. 
163. Id. 
164. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing whether corporations will utilize the NDPTCA 
in any large number (if at all), whether the law fixes the fraud of recent corporate scandals, and 
several unique provisions included in the NDPTCA). 
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IV. A SKEPTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NDPTCA 
It is important to note that incorporating under the NDPTCA is an en-
tirely optional decision for a corporation.165  The NDPTCA does not affect 
publicly traded corporations already incorporated in North Dakota, unless 
they choose to amend their articles of incorporation to be included under 
the new statute.166  Existing corporations in North Dakota, public or non-
public, are currently subject to North Dakota’s Business Corporation Act 
(BCA).167  The NDPTCA is not mandatory, so any new public corporation 
may still incorporate only under the BCA, and be subject to the provisions 
of the BCA alone.168  On the other hand, if a corporation wanted to place 
itself under the NDPTCA, the corporation would additionally opt into the 
NDPTCA and would then be governed by both the NDPTCA and the 
BCA.169 
To the extent that the NDPTCA has provided an additional choice for 
corporations, the law may be viewed as attractive since an increase in 
choice is thought to be desirable in almost every market.170  In fact, “the 
more-choice-is-better” argument is central to the “race-to-the-top” or share-
holder democracy advocates.171  These advocates have long argued that the 
lack of choice for increased shareholder power in the market has resulted in 
reduced shareholder wealth and benefited opportunistic managers.172 
However, despite the NDPTCA’s provision of an additional option for 
corporations, reasons remain to doubt any actual benefit.173  To begin, it is 
relatively unclear whether corporations or shareholders actually want these 
measures, especially all of the provisions contained in the law.174  After all, 
the very nature of statutory law cannot account for the wide range of 
 
165. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-02(6) (2007) (“‘Publicly traded corporation’ or ‘corporation’ 
means a corporation as defined in section 10-19.1-01:(a). That becomes governed by chapter 10-
19.1 after July 1, 2007; and (b).  The articles of which state that the corporation is governed by 
this chapter.”). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. § 10-19.1. 
168. See id. § 10-35-02(6) (maintaining that the articles of incorporation must state that the 
corporation will be governed by the NDPTCA). 
169. Id. 
170. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in 
Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 991 (2001) (responding to a proposed federal regulatory 
scheme that would arguably increase shareholder welfare). 
171. Id. at 966. 
172. Id. 
173. See id. at 964 (remaining skeptical of a proposed rule that would increase shareholder 
power). 
174. See Veasey, supra note 135, at 814-15 (stating that adopting governance proposals that 
reach too far could have adverse and unintended consequences). 
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characteristics and circumstances of diverse corporations.175  Even if the 
provisions of the NDPTCA appealed to a corporation, the corporation could 
adopt any one of the provisions (or all of them) in chapter 10-35 of the 
North Dakota Century Code simply by amending their articles of incorpora-
tion or bylaws.176  Indeed, many boards are already modifying their policies 
on governance matters regarding poison pills, staggered boards, and chang-
ing plurality to majority voting.177 
In the following discussion, Section A includes an analysis of which 
corporations may be interested in incorporating under this statutory 
scheme.178  Section B discusses whether this law begins to fix or address 
the governance problems associated with recent corporate scandals.179  Sec-
tion C includes an analysis of who may benefit and who may not under this 
new law.180  Finally, Section D notes the unique language applied in the 
NDPTCA in comparison with contemporary corporate statutory 
language.181 
A. WHO MIGHT UTILIZE THE NDPTCA? 
Potential benefits mentioned with the adoption of this law were 
increased revenue through franchise fees, infrastructure growth (needing 
more attorneys as a result of corporations incorporating into the state, 
resulting in increased litigation) and national recognition.182  Setting na-
tional recognition aside, for the other “benefits” to be realized, public 
corporations would actually have to incorporate in North Dakota.183  How-
ever, it is relatively unclear which corporations would find this law desira-
ble, and further, might actually take steps to incorporate under this new 
 
175. Id. at 825. 
176. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that the bylaws of a corporation 
contain many of the governance structures with respect to the corporation); Anabtawi, supra note 
55, at 569 (stating that corporate statutes generally grant shareholders the right to adopt, amend, 
and repeal bylaws). 
177. Veasey, supra note 135, at 814. 
178. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing scenarios under which companies might 
incorporate under the NDPTCA). 
179. See discussion infra Part IV.B (analyzing the gap between what the NDPTCA addresses 
and recent corporate scandals). 
180. See discussion infra Part IV.C (exploring which types of shareholders are likely to be 
the beneficiaries of the NDPTCA and which are not). 
181. See discussion infra Part IV.D (taking note of the unique statutory language contained 
in the NDPTCA). 
182. Hearing, supra note 103, at 2 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.).  “Enactment of 
Chapter 10-35 will be an opportunity for North Dakota to portray itself as committed to the future 
of capitalism and to strengthening the economy for the benefit of everyone.”  Id. 
183. See id. (noting the franchise fees and infrastructure growth potential). 
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law.184  The following discussion may not be an exhaustive list of ways a 
corporation could incorporate under North Dakota’s new statute, but pro-
vides three basic incorporation scenarios for doing so.185 
1. Existing Public Corporation’s Board of Directors 
Reincorporating by Choice 
The first option for utilization of the NDPTCA would be that an 
existing corporation’s board of directors would choose to reincorporate 
under this new statute.186  However, this seems unlikely since one important 
factor when choosing a state of incorporation is centralized management; 
that is the ability to make efficient decisions for the corporation.187  Since 
aspects of this law would take authority away from management in various 
ways, management would almost certainly be hesitant to even consider this 
law.188  Managers making the decision of where to incorporate, or even 
considering a reincorporation, would likely choose a state that embraces a 
centralized management system.189 
Since an incumbent board of directors is unlikely to initiate this action 
on its own, an alternative plan of action might be to change the make-up of 
the board by electing directors who would pledge to reincorporate the 
company under the NDPTCA.190  However, replacing even a majority of 
directors on the board could take some time, especially if the directors’ 
terms are staggered.191  It could take shareholders more than one annual 
election cycle to replace a majority of the board.192 
 
184. See Hearing on HB 1340 Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 60th N.D. Legis. 
Sess. (March 19, 2007) (statement of Secretary of State Al Jaeger) (“[W]e don’t know . . . we have 
no idea of where [the corporations are] going to come from.”). 
185. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1-3 (discussing several ways a company could, could 
not, or may not want to apply the NDPTCA to the corporation). 
186. See Stout, supra note 60, at 793 (noting that it is the board of directors who must initiate 
changes to the corporation). 
187. See Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 622. 
188. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-22 (2007) (limiting the duration of a poison pill, 
which is an antitakeover device); id. § 10-35-24 (restricting the minimum ownership for triggering 
poison pills); id. § 10-35-25 (stating the bylaws or articles of incorporation may restrict or prohibit 
the adoption of a poison pill by the corporation); id. § 10-35-26 (requiring that any antitakeover 
rule in the articles of incorporation or bylaws have approval of two-thirds of the shareholders and 
a majority of directors who are not officers in the corporation); id. § 10-35-27 (providing that the 
NDPTCA should be construed to favor shareholders by “enhancing” and “protecting” their rights). 
189. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 106, at 1749 (stating that the corporate 
hierarchy is well-suited to address the issues involving various corporate constituencies). 
190. Interview with Joshua Fershee, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota, 
Grand Forks, N.D. (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Fershee]. 
191. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569.  Staggered boards are put in place so that at any given 
time a majority of the board will be composed of members who have served at least one year.  2 
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 334.10.  The staggering of terms is usually accomplished by providing at 
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Further, once these new members are theoretically elected to the board 
of directors, there is no guarantee they would want to reincorporate to a 
state where the directors’ authority would be significantly weakened by the 
NDPTCA.193  Indeed, it may be that a board of directors wanting to appear 
“shareholder friendly” and who would actually be willing to make such a 
significant change as to move the state of incorporation, would arguably 
already be inclined to accept the type of proposals in the NDPTCA.194  If 
so, changing the state of incorporation would not be necessary if these 
changes could all be achieved without going through the process of rein-
corporation.195 
2. Reincorporation Forced by Insurgent Shareholders 
The second option, where an insurgent group forces reincorporation, 
also seems rather unlikely, since shareholders currently lack the authority to 
initiate a change in the state of incorporation.196  Presently, there is no state 
statute which provides a process for reincorporating to a different state.197  
Reincorporation generally takes the form of a merger and only the board of 
directors may initiate a vote on a merger proposal.198 
3. New Public Corporation by Volition 
One additional scenario for NDPTCA utilization is a newly created 
public company that would choose to incorporate under this new law.199  
Yet studies of corporate behavior as companies initially go public do not 
necessarily support this scenario.200  This is most evident from studies in 
the context of initial public offerings, also known as “IPOs.”201  The proc-
ess of “going public” by corporations gives every incentive to create a gov-
ernance structure that appeals to investors.202  If more shareholder control 
 
the outset that there shall be different classes of directors.  Id.  For example, a board may have the 
first class holding terms of one year; the second class, two years; and the third class, three years.  
Id. 
192. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569. 
193. See discussion supra note 188 (providing examples of situations where the board of 
directors’ authority would be weakened). 
194. Fershee, supra note 190. 
195. Id. 
196. Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 106, at 844. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Fershee, supra note 190.  However, substantial numbers of new incorporations or rein-
corporations under the NDPTCA appear unlikely.  Id. 
200. Stout, supra note 60, at 802. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
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over the company meant better returns for shareholders, IPO corporations 
could potentially boost the amount of capital raised by enacting share-
holder-friendly provisions.203  However, studies indicate that when IPOs 
use provisions to modify the voting rights of shareholders, they have gener-
ally weakened shareholder rights.204  For example, throughout the 1990s, 
between thirty-four and eighty-two percent of IPO charters contained 
provisions for staggered boards, effectively making it more difficult for 
directors on the board to be removed.205 
A more recent and remarkable example of the trend to weaken share-
holders’ authority is found in the Google IPO.206  Google’s use of a dual-
class charter207 virtually left outside investors powerless.208  Google’s dual-
class charter gave its founders shares with multiple votes, while the public 
could only get shares with one vote.209  Accordingly, if shareholders really 
wanted more authority over the governance of the corporation (and that in 
turn would truly maximize shareholder wealth), shareholders would have 
shunned the Google IPO.210  Conversely, investors, including sophisticated 
investors, oversubscribed the stock.211  In any case, the Google example 
demonstrated that investors did not consider increased shareholder partici-
pation so important as to withhold their investment.212  While investors 
themselves may not view increased shareholder participation as a beneficial 
part of investing their money, Part IV.B evaluates which groups may 
actually benefit from the NDPTCA.213 
 
 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Yawen Jiao, Dual-Class IPOs, Share Recapitalizations, and 
Unifications: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 (Dec. 2004), http://www.fma.org/Chicago/Papers/ 
dualclassIPOandunificationandrecapitalization.pdf.  When companies go public, entrepreneurs 
and insiders incorporate into the charter the voting structure of the shares.  Id.  Most corporations 
select a single class share structure, which means one share equals one vote.  Id.  However, a 
considerable minority (roughly eleven percent of U.S. IPOs in 2001 and over sixteen percent in 
2002) pick a dual class voting structure, where one class of shares has more voting rights than 
another class.  Id. 
208. Stout, supra note 60, at 802. 
209. Lynn A. Stout & Iman Anabtawi, Sometimes Democracy Isn’t Desirable, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 10, 2004, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB109209528252887073.html? 
mod=todays_us_marketplace. 
210. Stout, supra note 60, at 802. 
211. Id. 
212. See id. at 802-03 (noting that investors had “revealed” a preference for a corporation in 
which they retained little power as shareholders). 
213. See discussion infra Part IV.B (evaluating the potential benefits and drawbacks of the 
NDPTCA). 
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B. WHO IS THE DESIGNED BENEFICIARY OF NORTH DAKOTA’S 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STATUTE? 
As previously discussed, advantages mentioned with the adoption of 
the NDPTCA were increased revenue through franchise fees, infrastructure 
growth, and national recognition.214  Yet the question of benefits also raises 
the issue of exactly who might benefit from the law.215  Equally important 
to explore are some potential drawbacks if the NDPTCA were applied to a 
corporation.216 
1. Who may benefit and who may not? 
“Chapter 10-35 will be the first state corporation law to focus on 
providing a new model of shareholder rights that builds upon the best 
thinking of large institutional investors.”217  Part IV.B.1.a notes that it may 
indeed be large and institutional investors who benefit from this law, given 
the significant hurdles an average investor would face with respect to the 
NDPTCA.218  Further, Part IV.B.1.b looks at the nature of average public 
stockholders and their generally apathetic attitude towards the governance 
process.219 
a. Significant Hurdles 
North Dakota’s new law has been touted as the nation’s first 
“shareholder-friendly” law, but to which shareholders this new legislation is 
“friendly” is an interesting query.220  A proponent of the NDPTCA stated, 
“today an investor with a large position in a corporation may be essentially 
locked into its investment and have no choice but to focus on improving the 
governance of the corporation.”221  The NDPTCA, even if adopted and used 
 
214. See supra text accompanying note 182 (noting the alleged benefits mentioned in 
conjunction with adopting the NDPTCA). 
215. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (examining the hurdles and other reasons why small or 
average investors may not benefit from the NDPTCA). 
216. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how the board of directors may serve as a 
body to protect shareholders from each other). 
217. Hearing, supra note 103, at 1 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.). 
218. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.a (noting the huge financial hurdles to access some 
provisions of the NDPTCA). 
219. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.b (observing the widely accepted notion that most 
shareholders in a publicly traded company are rationally apathetic). 
220. See Reid, supra note 8, at B1 (stating that the law has been publicized as a progressive 
infrastructure law for public corporations). 
221. Hearing, supra note 103, at 2 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.) (emphasis added). 
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by a corporation, would not necessarily benefit the small or even average 
investor.222 
Certain portions of the NDPTCA do embrace the idea that all share-
holders may participate in the governance process.223  Yet in other places of 
the act there remain significant restrictions on who may participate, such as 
accessing the corporation’s proxy statement.224  If a shareholder is not a 
“qualified” shareholder, he or she is not entitled to nominate candidates on 
the proxy.225  To be considered a “qualified shareholder” the law requires 
that the person or group own more than five percent of the outstanding 
shares.226  Additionally, the law provides that shareholders demanding a 
special meeting must own at least ten percent of the voting power of all 
shares entitled to vote.227 
Though the proxy requirement and the special shareholder meeting in 
the law contain seemingly insignificant hurdles of five and ten percent, it is 
important to keep in mind that these provisions pertain specifically to the 
public corporation.228  A public corporation’s capitalization229 is likely to be 
substantial.230  For example, in 2005 the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) listed the median market capitalization as $1.7 billion, with the 
largest market capitalization as $371.7 billion and the smallest as $4.8 
million.231  In 2005, the median market capitalization of the S&P 500 was 
 
222. See Cheryl Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S. 
Securities Regulatory Framework: A Lesson From Canada, Our Neighbor to the North, 10 CHAP. 
L. REV. 391, 394 n.2 (2006) (defining small investors as individuals who invest relatively small 
amounts of money in the U.S. securities markets); INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, 
EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 10 (2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_05_equity_ 
owners.pdf (noting that median household financial assets in equities was $65,000 and that equity 
owners, on average, held fifty-five percent of their household financial assets in individual stock 
or stock mutual funds in 2005).  See also Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s 
Application to Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 816 (2007) (noting that private 
investors directly own a small percentage of securities). 
223. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-05(1) (2007) (“Any shareholder of a publicly 
traded corporation may propose the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a bylaw.” (emphasis 
added)). 
224. See id. § 10-35-08(2) (restricting access to only “qualified shareholders”).  In public 
corporations, voting occurs before the shareholder meeting, since most shareholders do not attend.  
PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 110.  The use of proxies allows shareholders to vote on 
certain matters or to delegate their vote to another who will be present at the meeting.  Id. 
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08(3) (2007). 
226. Id. § 10-35-02(8). 
227. Id. § 10-35-13(1). 
228. Id. § 10-35-02(6). 
229. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (8th ed. 2004) (defining capitalization as “the total par 
value or stated value of the authorized or outstanding stock of a corporation”). 
230. See Wilshire Assoc., Fundamental Characteristics of the Wilshire 5000, http://www. 
wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html (noting that public corporations 
command a total market capitalization of more than $16 trillion). 
231. NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX (2006) http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/key_benefits_nya.pdf. 
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around $9.8 billion.232  The average investor’s portfolio,233 coupled with the 
fact that many investors these days are diversified among companies, makes 
it even less likely that a small or average investor would have the requisite 
five or ten percent required amount in a single public corporation to trigger 
certain provisions. 234  For example, taking the median capitalization of a 
corporation on the NYSE of $1.7 billion, the five or ten percent triggers 
would require a shareholder to have $85 million or $170 million, respec-
tively.235 
This section does not intend to argue that certain triggers or hurdles 
should not be established with respect to shareholder access and the gover-
nance process, because there are many thresholds in corporate law today.236  
However, thresholds should be carefully considered.237  For example, sec-
tion 10-35-08 of the North Dakota Century Code (requiring only a five 
percent trigger to access the company’s proxy) is patterned after an SEC 
proposal from 2003.238  Some critics have suggested that a more appropriate 
threshold for this type of provision would be a twenty-five percent trigger, 
because it would establish a more substantial shareholder interest and 
would be a more trustworthy indicator that the costs and disruption of con-
tested elections is reasonable.239  An elevated threshold would also lessen 
the probability of a corporation receiving a director contest proposal from a 
 
232. Stephen Biggar & Robert Gold, These 40 Stocks—the PowerPicks 2005 Portfolio—
Represents S&P Analysts’ Top Choices From Among the 1,500 That They Cover, BUS. WK. 
ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 170351 (Westlaw). 
233. INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 222, at 10. 
234. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 95, 134 (1995) (“Most individuals either hold diversified portfolios of investments or 
invest in corporations indirectly through institutions such as mutual funds.  Accordingly, they care 
little about the internal affairs of individual companies”); Page, supra note 222, at 816 (noting that 
vast majority of securities are institutionally owned and not directly held).  Equities these days are 
much less likely to be selected by individuals and more likely to be held as part of a “large port-
folio of stocks weighted by their market capitalization.”  Id. (quoting Utpal Bhatacharya & Neal 
Galpin, The Global Rise of the Value-Weighted Portfolio 1, AFA Chicago Meetings Paper (Mar. 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627). 
235. NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX, supra note 231; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-02(8), (13) 
(2007). 
236. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-17 (requiring shareholder consent before a firm 
issues shares having more than twenty percent of the outstanding votes); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 6.21(f)(1) (2002) (establishing a similar twenty percent requirement for the issuance of shares). 
237. See John J. Castellani & Amy L. Goodman, The Case against the SEC Director 
Election Proposal, in Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot, 21 (2004), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/alumnipapers/SEC_Director_Election.Castellani.and
.Goodman.pdf (urging caution in that a specific voting trigger would be available to shareholders 
of all public companies, not only those with an ineffective proxy process). 
238. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48, 626, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 60, 784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (proposing Rule 14a-11); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08; Hearing, 
supra note 103, at 3 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.). 
239. Castellani & Goodman, supra note 237, at 21. 
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single large shareholder with a personal grievance against the company or 
its board.240  Whether the threshold is five or twenty-five percent, they both 
likely mean the average or small shareholder will not to be able to achieve 
these financial hurdles, nor as discussed below, will they likely make the 
effort to aggregate their shares due to rational apathy of shareholders in 
public firms.241 
b. Shareholder Apathy 
It is not simply the amount of money it takes to access some provisions 
of the NDPTCA that shows the law assists large shareholders; it is also the 
nature of shareholders that make up a public firm.242  A single shareholder 
need not possess the entire five percent, ten percent, or whatever trigger 
level is required, because they may collectively pool their resources with 
other shareholders.243  However, the likelihood of a small or average share-
holder initiating this action is unlikely, since “shareholders face well-known 
collective action and rational apathy problems.”244  The shareholders of a 
publicly traded company are generally considered passive and would rather 
sell their shares than challenge the management of the corporation.245 
An example of rational apathy is given where, in the case of a director 
challenge from activist shareholders, smaller or average shareholders fre-
quently lack incentives to become informed about the competing candidates 
for whom they are voting.246  “This is the classic problem of rational apa-
thy: for the average shareholder, collecting and absorbing the necessary 
information will entail a much higher opportunity cost than the expected 
benefit, which is low because most shareholder votes will have little indivi-
dual impact on the outcome.”247  Since shareholders lack the incentives and 
information to make a decision, it is more cost effective to convey the 
information to a central place to have the board make the collective 
 
240. Id. 
241. See discussion supra note 231 (noting that the median capitalization of the NYSE is 
$1.7 billion); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing the potential millions of dollars it 
may take shareholders to access certain provisions of the NDPTCA and the apathetic nature of 
shareholders in a public corporation). 
242. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 87 (noting that shareholders of public 
companies are by and large widely dispersed). 
243. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-02(8) (2007). “‘Qualified shareholder’ means a person or 
group of persons acting together.”  Id. 
244. Choi & Guzman, supra note 170, at 987. 
245. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 111. 
246. John F. Olson, Professor Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to “The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise,” 93 VA. L. REV. 773, 784 (2007). 
247. Id. 
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decision.248  Consequently, shareholders would rather entrust decision-
making authority to the board of directors because in the long run, this 
efficient system will maximize shareholder wealth.249 
Shareholder activism sometimes wins support from smaller share-
holders, but it is spearheaded in each case by large shareholders.250  Large 
shareholders have more at stake and are more inclined to battle than small 
shareholders.251  Herein lies the issue with a statute like the NDPTCA: 
larger shareholders will simply have a larger voice.252  A fair question to 
ask is whether this “greater voice” of large shareholders could place smaller 
shareholders at risk of becoming disadvantaged if large stockholders are 
given a more active role in the governance process.253  The following sec-
tion discusses several examples where large shareholders use their influence 
at the expense of other shareholders.254 
2. Potential Drawbacks: Shareholder Opportunism 
Corporate management has been criticized for opportunism, yet share-
holders are not excluded from this type of action, either.255  Directors are 
certainly capable of making opportunistic threats.256  However, the differ-
ence between director and shareholder opportunism is that, “unlike share-
holders, directors do not benefit financially from making threats, at least not 
in their positions as directors.”257  One way to look at the power given to 
the board of directors is that it serves shareholders by protecting them from 
one another.258  The director primacy model can help referee the deep 
divisions between shareholders, especially large shareholders, who may 
have private interests in conflict with maximizing overall shareholder value 
and who are most likely to exercise their shareholder power.259 
 
248. Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 624 (citing KENNETH 
J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68 (1974)). 
249. Id. 
250. Rodrigues, supra note 152, at 1404. 
251. Id. 
252. See id. (“It is true that in shareholder democracy larger shareholders have a greater 
voice.”). 
253. See Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 575 (explaining that certain shareholders in public 
firms may have private interests that can actually work to disadvantage some shareholders). 
254. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the role that opportunism may play among 
various shareholders). 
255. See Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 575 (stating that shareholders in public firms may have 
private interests that can lead to opportunistic behavior). 
256. Stout, supra note 60, at 797. 
257. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
258. Id. at 794. 
259. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 564. 
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Shareholders may use persuasion not only to enhance shareholder 
values, but also to attain private benefits.260  In theory, one shareholder, or 
several shareholders holding the same preferences, would be able to specify 
with one voice an objective for running the corporation.261  Nonetheless, if 
shareholders have private interests, they may have a preference that the 
company pursue certain interests differently and possibly at the expense of 
other shareholders.262  These existing private interests no longer make it 
appropriate to think of shareholder action “as a collective good.”263  
Shareholders could use their own interests, for example, to pursue labor 
interests, push forward a “social” agenda, or obtain “greenmail” benefits.264 
In addition, “rent-seeking” activities by shareholders are a concern that 
may result in reduced shareholder value.265  The costs of rent-seeking are 
manifested in distorted decision-making and resources spent in transferring 
wealth.266  A classic example of how a shareholder can create costs within a 
corporation is the du Pont investment in General Motors (GM).267  Du Pont 
substantially increased its equity interest within GM in order to obtain a 
large portion of GM’s leather, paint and varnish business.268  After buying a 
large amount of stock, du Pont used its influence as a large shareholder and 
became the major supplier to GM of those foregoing products.269  The GM 
case illustrates a large investor using influence to further its private inter-
ests, even though the transaction increased production costs for GM.270  The 
deal generated an interest cost for GM shareholders because GM had en-
tered into a less than favorable agreement with du Pont.271 
The Perry Capital example is a more modern instance of “rent-seeking” 
where a large investor used their power to push for strategies that increased 
the worth of another security held by the investor.272  Perry Capital, a hedge 
 
260. Id. at 574. 
261. Id. at 575. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 720 
(2007).  “Greenmail” is the buying back of stock by a corporation from a transient, threatening 
investor at a preferential price to end the threat of a takeover.  David Manry & David Stangeland, 
Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 217, 224 (2001). 
265. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 575.  “‘Rent seeking’ is the socially costly attempt to obtain 
wealth transfers.”  Id. 
266. Id.  
267. Id. at 576. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Stout, supra note 60, at 794. 
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fund, acquired a block of Mylan Laboratories common stock.273  Simultane-
ously, Perry Capital entered into a derivatives contract with a brokerage 
firm that allowed Perry Capital to keep its Mylan Laboratories votes while 
hedging away its financial interest in the stock.274  Perry then used its status 
as a large shareholder to pressure Mylan’s board of directors to acquire 
another company, King Pharmaceuticals.275  This acquisition took place at a 
hefty premium over market price.276  Why would Perry, as such a large 
shareholder in Mylan, want Mylan to overpay for King Pharmaceuticals?277  
Likely because Perry Capital was also a large shareholder of King stock and 
had not hedged away its economic interest in King.278  In other words, Perry 
had retained the voting rights as a Mylan shareholder without any of the 
financial risk.279 
Indeed, deep divisions exist between shareholders of a corporation.280  
Some shareholders have long-term interests, and generally have little regard 
for short-term developments.281  However, a short-term investor sells and 
buys shares frequently and is concerned with short-term values of stock.282  
These two interests can lead to a divergence in preferences as to how a 
corporation makes decisions.283  For example, short-term investors would 
prefer short-term inflation of stock, while long-term shareholders would be 
willing to forego the short-term gains for future appreciation.284  Certain 
shareholders are primarily interested in a big profit in a short time and keep 
a “laser-beam focus on quarter-to-quarter earnings.”285  Other examples of 
divergent shareholders’ interests include diversified versus undiversified 
shareholders286 and inside versus outside shareholders.287 
 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 794-95.  Perry set up a complicated trade so that it had practically no exposure to 
changes in Mylan’s stock price, which likely would have dropped if it purchased King.  Posting of 
Justin Hibbard to Deal Flow [hereinafter Posting of Hibbard], http://www.businessweek.com 
/the_thread/dealflow/archives/2006/ 01/the_not_so-divi.html (Jan. 11, 2006, 13:20 EST). 
279. Posting of Hibbard, supra note 278. 
280. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 577. 
281. Id. at 579. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 581. 
284. Id. 
285. Strine, supra note 106, at 1764.  “[Short-termism] helped create managerial incentives 
that contributed to the debacles at corporations like Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and 
Adelphia.”  Id. 
286. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 583. 
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Whatever the different interests of shareholders may be, du Pont and 
Perry Capital serve as cautionary tales and illustrate the danger inherent in 
changing corporate laws in a way that gives opportunistic shareholders in 
public firms greater leverage over boards.288  Indeed, transferring more au-
thority to shareholders will likely only aggravate rent-seeking behavior.289  
Certainly providing shareholders with more rights can create risks to other 
shareholders, but the following section addresses an equally important 
issue: Whether the NDPTCA actually works to address the scandals and 
frauds that have beleaguered some corporations.290 
C. THE NDPTCA DOES LITTLE TO ADDRESS RECENT CORPORATE 
SCANDALS 
In the wake of apparent executive malfeasance and director negligence 
of recent corporate scandals, there have been renewed calls for increased 
shareholder participation.291  In fact, testimony by a proponent of the 
NDPTCA stated that the scandals of Enron and WorldCom law have not 
ended.292  While the NDPTCA modestly addresses the recent anger caused 
over CEO compensation,293 there is likely little or nothing in the rest of the 
Act that would have prevented or minimized the damage caused by the 
scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others.294 
In these recent scandals, federal disclosure rules were violated and 
fraud was committed.295  Yet, the frauds perpetrated in those cases bear 
little relationship or remedy to the main thrusts of the NDPTCA, which 
applies restrictions on antitakeover defenses and enhances shareholders’ 
power to adopt bylaws and vote, among others.296  Keep in mind that 
current reform efforts, as embodied in the NDPTCA, are aimed to some 
extent at “reunifying” ownership and control in the modern public 
 
287. Id. at 586.  Inside shareholders are shareholders who are firm employees as opposed to 
outside investors who invest externally.  Id. 
288. Stout, supra note 60, at 795. 
289. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 577. 
290. See discussion infra Part IV.C (explaining that there is little or nothing in the NDPTCA 
to protect shareholders from the frauds of recent corporate scandals). 
291. Stout, supra note 60, at 806. 
292. Hearing, supra note 103, at 2 (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr.). 
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-12(5) (2007).  The statute obliges the compensation com-
mittee of the board of directors to report to the shareholders at each regular meeting of share-
holders.  Id.  Shareholders are able to vote as to whether they accept the report, but only on an 
advisory basis.  Id. 
294. See Stout, supra note 60, at 806 (“Enron did not collapse because its shareholders did 
not have enough power.”). 
295. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 129. 
296. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-05, 10-35-22 to -25 (2007). 
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company.297  Reunifying ownership and control is very different from the 
frauds committed in the last few years, and none of the provisions in the 
NDPTCA address disclosure or strengthen criminal penalties for fraud.298  
In addition, if directors or officers within a publicly traded corporation 
commit fraud by withholding or falsifying information, shareholders are 
helpless to protect themselves in any case.299  Simply stated, the provisions 
of the NDPTCA do not address any further measures that would protect 
shareholders from these fraudulent actions.300  
Aside from failing to deal with real issues in corporate governance, 
there are some provisions in the NDPTCA that use unique language with 
respect to business statutory schemes.301  That is, certain provisions appear 
to have no corresponding counterpart in any other business statute.302  
Section D compares the enabling shareholder rights language to other 
business statutory schemes.303 
D. PROVISION PROVIDING UNIQUE LANGUAGE COMPARED WITH 
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE LAW 
The NDPTCA creates a rule of construction mandating that the “pro-
visions of this chapter and of chapter 10-19.1 must be liberally construed to 
protect and enhance the rights of shareholders in publicly traded corpora-
tions.”304  The statutory directive to liberally construe the Act has no 
counterpart in either the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), 
the current version of the MBCA, the BCA, or in any other of North 
Dakota’s corporate statutes.305  Its requirement of “liberal construction,” 
which is sometimes found in remedial306 or consumer307 legislation is 
 
297. Anabtawi, supra note 55, at 569. 
298. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-35; see Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for 
Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31, 
39 (2007) (stating that many of the recent corporate fraud cases involved incorrect and deceptive 
disclosures that broke existing laws). 
299. Interview with Jason Kilborn, Visiting Professor of Law, University of North Dakota, 
Grand Forks, N.D. (Feb. 3, 2007). 
300. Id. 
301. See § 10-35-27 (calling for the statute to be interpreted liberally to protect and increase 
shareholder rights). 
302. See discussion infra Part IV.D (discussing the unique language placed in the NDPTCA 
compared with contemporary corporate law). 
303. See discussion infra Part IV.D (contrasting and comparing the NDPTCA with other 
corporate statutes). 
304. § 10-35-27. 
305. N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 10 (2007); id. § 10-19.1; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2002); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (1984). 
306. See AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 185 (2007) (explaining that the purpose of liberal 
interpretation of remedial statutes should be to give them a fair construction and promote justice). 
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applied here in the context of corporate law.308  Business entity law differs 
from consumer or remedial legislation in that it largely deals with indivi-
duals who freely choose to invest financial resources and are aware of the 
rules and risks up front.309 
Further, the directive to construe the Act to “enhance” shareholder 
rights finds no similar provision in any version of the MBCA, or any other 
North Dakota corporate statutes.310  The language singling out shareholders 
as the group whose rights are to be protected and enhanced is interesting in 
light of all the constituencies a corporation serves.311  While this language 
of favoring shareholders is consistent with the overall concept of the 
NDPTCA, its inclusion in a business law statute is an unusual step to be 
sure.312 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of whether North Dakota’s new corporate governance 
statute is ever realized in actual application, the central message behind this 
new law is that the balance between shareholders and directors is in need of 
a massive overhaul.313  Even Sarbanes-Oxley, the federal response to recent 
corporate scandals, which presented a marked departure in the federal gov-
ernment’s role of corporate regulation, certainly did not mandate or even 
suggest a fundamental structural overhaul between shareholders, managers, 
and directors.314  After hundreds of years of American corporate law, a 
delicate but important balance has been achieved within our distinctive 
 
307. See 21 C.J.S. Credit Reporting Agencies § 36 (2007) (“Generally, consumer protection 
statutes are to be construed liberally and broadly in favor of consumers.”). 
308. § 10-35-27. 
309. See Stout, supra note 60, at 801 (explaining that an often-overlooked fact of business is 
that investors are not forced to purchase shares in public corporations).  Alternatively, investors 
have the option of investing in closely held corporations, sole proprietorships, partnerships, and 
limited partnerships.  Id. 
310. N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 10 (2007); id. § 10-19.1; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2002); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (1984). 
311. See Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 60, at 626 (noting all the 
constituencies affected by corporate governance). 
312. See Fershee, supra note 190 (noting that the language enhancing shareholder rights is a 
nod to the overall notion of the entire statute). 
313. See Veasey, supra note 135, at 816 (replying to several major proposed reforms of 
Lucian Bebchuk with respect to increasing the authority of shareholders). 
314. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 130 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley tried to 
regulate corporate governance by increasing the monitoring of corporations and managers); 
Romano, supra note 4, at 1523 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley altered the traditional authority of the 
state and federal government by providing specific legislative directives for SEC regulation, 
something formerly perceived as the states’ exclusive jurisdiction). 
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federalist system, and a fundamental overhaul is unnecessary.315  The sys-
tem in place (apart from the NDPTCA) is an arrangement that balances the 
relationships and responsibilities of directors, shareholders and officers 
along with what is generally the appropriate role of the state and federal 
governments to manage the internal affairs and regulate the markets.316 
Bearing in mind the rational apathy and financial hurdles shareholders 
face in accessing some provisions of the NDPTCA, this new law is clearly 
not about “corporate democracy,” but rather provides tools for the large 
investor.317  Recent shareholder activism certainly demonstrates that large 
shareholders can find it worthwhile to agitate for changes within corpora-
tions.318  For example, Kirk Kerkorian, with his almost ten percent stake in 
GM, was able to place an ally on the board of directors and pressure for 
overall strategic changes.319  Carl Icahn successfully used his status as a 
large shareholder of Time Warner to have the company buy back twenty 
billion dollars worth of stock and was able to place two directors on its 
board.320  An investor with a significant share of stock at Six Flags effec-
tively replaced the CEO,321 and an individual shareholder resisting Novartis 
AG’s acquisition of Chiron Corporation brought the deal into doubt.322  
Individual shareholders are not the only activist shareholders, as evidenced 
by the institutional activities of California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS) and the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees.323 
Protecting shareholders is and always should be a priority, but increas-
ing some shareholders’ power via the NDPTCA is not the way to protect 
shareholders from fraud.324  Rather, the concept of a shareholder democracy 
appears to be driven by emotion and an assumption that greater shareholder 
control must be a good thing, “like Mom and apple pie.”325  Even if corpo-
rate management and directors respond to activist shareholders and adopt 
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different codes of practice, these are not signs that individual shareholders 
are gaining a more meaningful voice in the corporate decision-making 
processes.326 
Additionally, not only do the foregoing examples show that large 
shareholders find it worthwhile to “agitate for change,” but that they are ca-
pable of accomplishing their objectives without the help of North Dakota’s 
new law.327  North Dakota’s novel approach to corporate governance will 
likely face challenges with respect to corporations that will actually incor-
porate under this law—and it may be the overall impact of this law is little 
to nothing.328  Yet, with the premise of this law looking to assist large 
stockholders, perhaps whether one thinks North Dakota’s new law is a good 
idea depends on how much they trust those large shareholders.329 
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